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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

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Referred to: _RADM Jonathan White_

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[Emphasis added].

Admiral WHITE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. First of all, good morning, Chairman Hunter; good morning, Ranking Member Garamendi; good morning, other subcommittee members. My name is Rear Admiral Jonathan White, and I currently serve, as mentioned, as the oceanographer and navigator of the Navy, and as the lead of the Navy's Task Force Climate Change. I have submitted my full written statement to the committee. I ask that it be made part of the hearing record. And, with your permission, I will give a brief opening statement.

I join my colleagues in supporting the President's National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Navy's preparations in implementing U.S. policy in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is experiencing significant change in its seasonal ice coverage, which is making it more accessible to maritime activity. The diminishing sea ice is slowly opening the region to increased commercial activity and shipping.

As the maritime domain, the Navy has responsibilities in the Arctic. In support of the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the Department of the Defense Arctic Strategy, the Navy has identified four strategy objectives: ensure U.S. Arctic sovereignty; provide ready naval forces; to preserve freedom of the seas; and promote partnerships.

We acknowledge that the risk of conflict in the region

is currently low. The Arctic Council and other diplomatic venues provide effective means to resolve disputes between nations. However, the U.S. Navy must be ready to operate in this challenging environment, just as it does routinely on, under, and above every other ocean.

History shows us that the presence of navies on the world's oceans provides security and stability that promote economic development and commerce. As President Theodore Roosevelt stated over 110 years ago, 'A good navy is not a provocation to war, it is the surest guarantee of peace.''

The Navy's existing posture is appropriate to address the near-term defense requirements in the Arctic, primarily through under-sea assets. For the Navy to develop the full range of capabilities it has in other oceans will take time.

This past February, the chief of naval operations,

Admiral Jonathan Greenert, signed the U.S. Navy Arctic Road

Map 2014 - 2030, which aligns with the National Arctic

Strategy and the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. It

includes a detailed Implementation Plan to develop Arctic

capabilities and capacity in step with the changing

environment.

Over the next decade, the Navy will continue to develop capabilities and experience, largely through personal exchanges and exercises in the high latitudes, and primarily in the open water during the summer season. We will also

continue to conduct research to better understand and predict the complex Arctic environment and how it relates to safe and effective naval operations.

Our challenge over the coming decade will be to balance the resource demands of current requirements with investments in the development of future capabilities. To accomplish this, the Navy will emphasis low-cost, long lead-time activities, and use partnerships to ensure we do this in cost-effective and smart ways. Over the course of the next few years, the Navy will continue to leverage strong partnerships with the U.S. Coast Guard and other national and international Arctic partners and stakeholders to cooperatively address the challenges of Arctic operation.

These challenges are substantial, the Arctic Ocean is a vast and remote frontier with little shore infrastructure to support operations, frequent extreme hazardous wind and sea conditions, very limited navigation aids, dated and unreliable navigation charts, and limited communications. By the mid-2020's, we predict the summer sea ice will diminish to the point of opening a near-polar deepwater transit route across the Arctic for at least several days during the late summer.

As commercial enterprise in the Arctic slowly increase during this period, new mission requirements for the Navy will likely be to assist the Coast Guard and other nations

with search and rescue or disaster response. But we may also be called upon to ensure freedom of navigation in Arctic waters. We will continue to transition toward the capability to operate on and above the sea for sustained periods, as required.

By 2030, the Navy looks to have the necessary trained and equipped personnel, along with surface, subsurface, and air capabilities to respond to contingencies and emergencies affecting national security in the Arctic. The U.S. Navy must be prepared to sail on to distant and remote waters to protect national interests and freedom of the seas.

We are confronted today by the prospect of a newly accessible ocean, one that presents significantly more challenges than other maritime regions. Fortunately, we have time to prepare. We have made significant progress in understanding those challenges, and preparing the Navy for success. The key, again, will be to balance potential investments with other service priorities. But we are moving forward with a flexible approach, and we know we can keep pace with the evolving Arctic region, as we protect our national security interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Garamendi and committee members, for the opportunity to appear before you today. This concludes my oral statement, and I look forward to your questions.

| 365 | Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Admiral. They have a nickname in |
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| 366 | the Navy for the Navigator of the Navy? I mean, do you have |
| 367 | a nickname? They call you ''Nav'' or anything? |
| 368 | Admiral WHITE. The best job and title for a flag officer |
| 369 | in the Navy, sir, in my opinion. (end) |
| 370 | [Laughter.] |
| 371 | Mr. HUNTER. That is great. 'The Navigator.' |
| 372 | Admiral WHITE. The Navigator would be better. |
| 373 | Mr. HUNTER. Ambassador Balton, you are recognized |

522 northwest coast of Alaska to attempt to continue its drilling 523 operations that it started back in the summer of 2012. 524 So, it is purely from an operational standpoint that we 525 see the importance of it, and we articulated that. why we put out an Arctic Strategy. We really wanted to make 526 it clear that, despite the challenges associated with the 527 resourcing of Arctic needs, the demand for presence won't go 528 529 away. And, as I said, as other nations -- whether we ultimately develop much off of our own Arctic coast, the 530 531 development that is existing elsewhere in the Arctic, and the 532 stuff that I have seen going on through my travels, tells me 533 that we are going to want to pay attention to it. 534 Mr. HUNTER. Thanks. Admiral White, when is the Navy 535 going to put forward funds for an icebreaker, if it is so 536 important? 537 Admiral WHITE. Sir, we view--and since the mid-1960s, 538 icebreaking has been a Coast Guard mission. We support the 539 Coast Guard's strategy and their requirements for icebreaking 540 for the Arctic and anywhere else that it may be needed. rely on them, we support them. We are working very closely 541 542 with them in an integrated planning team--($e\alpha \sigma$ 543 Mr. HUNTER. You support them with money? 544 Admiral WHITE.)--requirements. (ON A

545 Mr. HUNT 546 Admiral

Mr. HUNTER. You support them with money?

Admiral WHITE.) We do not support them with part of our

budget, sir. They were given the mission, we are a mission-funded organization. And so, we rely on them. But we support them totally with the requirements. We work hand in hand, whether it is icebreakers or maybe aircraft carriers or landing ships. It is a team approach that we do to all the operations that we are involved in together. But icebreaking was given to the Coast Guard, and we are in full support of them.

Mr. BALTON. So, unlike my colleagues, the mission of my agency is a little bit different. The Department of State has as its mission to carry out U.S. foreign policy. We don't break ice, we don't operate at sea.

That said, I agree with you, that--with respect to the importance of having icebreaking capability in the Arctic and Antarctic, including for our foreign policy and our presence. But I would not agree that is the only measure of the importance of the Arctic to our nation. There is a lot going on in the Arctic. The icebreaking issue is only one facet of many.

Mr. HUNTER. As I have got 13 seconds left, let me ask this. Does the Navy have a national security requirement for a heavy icebreaker in the Arctic? Yes or no?

Admiral WHITE. The Navy has a requirement for icebreaking to support assured access in the Arctic, as--under the Coast Guard--agreement with the Coast Guard,

that they will do the icebreaking for us. Right now we have no requirement to build--for the U.S. Navy to build an icebreaker for the Arctic, and we rely on the Coast Guard's capability to break ice. They are meeting the requirements that we have in the near term, and we fully support that, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. All right, thank you. Mr. Garamendi is recognized.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just very quickly on this, the number that I have heard for a new icebreaker is somewhere in the half-a-billion dollar range. And I would just tell all of us that are on the Armed Services Committee that we expect to spend, in the next 10 years, some \$15 billion rebuilding the B61 bomb that nobody knows what to do with.

So, we have choices, and we ought to look to ourselves about the choices we make. We are committed to that 15 billion. We could take half-a-dozen of those unnecessary, unused bombs, and build a icebreaker. These are our choices. Responsibility really does lie here.

Enough of that. I want to hit the Law of the Sea. Mr. Ambassador, you spoke quickly to that issue. I would like you to expand upon it, and really why it is important. And also, why, in your view, it has not yet passed the Senate, so we can blame them, rather than us, on this one.

[Laughter.]

But when I was in the Coast Guard, we referred to the Navy as the 'Big Outfit.'' So what does the Big Outfit say in response to my question?

Admiral WHITE. And I hope the Big Outfit doesn't mean we are the fatted calf to pay for icebreakers, sir, but thank you for the opportunity.

We are larger. We certainly have large force structure.

But our force structure is designed to meet the mission

requirements for national security and defense, as outlined.

These are very austere budget times. We are faced with challenges, in terms of replacing our SSBN force in the future: aircraft carriers, an aging fleet of other surface combatants, submarines and aircraft. We have no plan to build an icebreaker. We have no mission for icebreaking. Therefore, we see the great partnership that I know you are aware between Navy and Coast Guard, sir, as the means by which we will rely on the Coast Guard for that mission, as it stands right now. We are happy with that, and we are happy with the Coast Guard's assessment on how they are going to meet those mission requirements in the future, sir.

Mr. COBLE. Ambassador, you mentioned that there are other issues in the Arctic, in addition to the Coast Guard icebreaker issue. Are any of those other issues as pressing for resolution as is the icebreaker issue? That may be subject to personal interpretation.

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822 you tell--give me a sense, and the subcommittee a sense of 823 how the Navy was engaged in the construction of our last 824 icebreaker, the Healy? About 1990-ish. 825 Admiral WHITE.)Yes, sir. In the 1980s, Congress provided the funding that had been set aside to build Healy 826 to the Navy to run the acquisition program. 827 Then, in the building of Healy, it was a team effort. So the program 828 management and the actual building, outfitting, transition of 829 operations, was a Coast Guard/Navy partnership approach. 830 831 it was purely because the funding was put into our shipbuilding coffers, not out of hide, as it were, to do 832 833 that, sir. ((n) 834 Mr. LARSEN. So it was a separate dollar amount, and it was part of the overall shipbuilding account, set aside 835 836 within the Navy shipbuilding account? 837 Admiral WHITE.) Yes, sir. 838 Mr. LARSEN. Is that how that worked? Okay, yes. Admiral 839 Neffenger, any comment on that? 840 Admiral NEFFENGER. I think he is accurate on that score. I don't--I wasn't involved in that--841 842 Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 843 Admiral NEFFENGER. -- at that time, with the details on that. But I do know that the money was given to the Navy 844 shipbuilding account at the time, and we leveraged the 845

capabilities of NAVSEA and Navy acquisition professionals to

So, you always want that capability. But I would agree with you, that you want to reduce the requirements and descope them as much as possible, so that what you have is a purpose-built, heavy icebreaker that can conduct the basis round of Coast Guard missions.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi?

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just quickly, I think for all of us on this side of the panel, the Healy gives us an opportunity and a thought process on how it might be done. Money in the defense budget was used to build the Healy through the Navy, a process that we should take a look at, if we are serious about having a new heavy icebreaker.

I want to go back to the Northern Sea Route. We were discussing that issue. It seems to me to be one that we need to understand, relationships with Russia and the rest.

Admiral White, you were going to take up that issue.

Admiral WHITE. Yes, sir, Ranking Member Garamendi, thank you.

The Northern Sea Route represents the most navigable sea route that is open for certain periods of time during the late summer during the ice minimum in the Arctic. We anticipate, by the mid-2020s, that it will be ice free, which, under international definition, means less than 10 percent ice coverage, for up to 6 weeks per year. That

represents significant amount of transit across that passage, even without necessarily having to have an icebreaker.

We look at the Northern Sea Route, and especially the entrance to it through the Bering Strait, as a strategic crossroads that we are concerned about, just like we are all those crossroads, this one especially because we own part of that strategic crossroads. So, as we monitor what is happening in the Northern Sea Route, we do so from a national security perspective, but also understanding that the way that these routes unfold in the Arctic, we anticipate that they will do so peacefully, with low risk of conflict. We have no anticipation of that.

We also, as I mentioned, are looking for a deepwater route to start opening up in the mid-2020 time frame, which would be near the pole, and would provide another alternative, although it would unfold and open up more slowly, certainly, than the Northern Sea Route. But all these routes are going to change the way that the Arctic is looked at, and we are monitoring them closely, as we watch our missions evolve, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you.

Mr. BALTON. Thank you, sir. I don't have much to add. You suggested that relations with Russia are problematic; that is certainly so. However, our nations do have common interests in the Arctic, and one of them is to prevent or

breath as you began. 1222 1223 [Laughter.] 1224 Mr. GARAMENDI. So finish, and then the admiral--Mr. BALTON. No, I was just trying to recall what I had 1225 1226 heard about that. But the answer is yes. 1227 Mr. GARAMENDI. Admiral, anything to add? Admiral WHITE.) With the qualifier the ambassador put in, 1228 1229 I agree. The Russians are very careful, in that 1230 they--certain ships going through there must be escorted during certain parts, because of the concerns with navigating 1231 safely, the hazardous conditions that are involved, and some 1232 of these choke point areas going through the Northern Sea 1233 Route. So they do also require that vessels meet a certain 1234 limit through the Polar Code and other requirements, in terms 1235 of the ship's ability to maintain and sustain itself in going 1236 1237 through those passages. So, it is open with conditions, I think, is the best way 1238 to say it, sir. ($\ell N O$ 1239 1240 Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. I have completed my questions on this particular panel. So I will yield back what time 1241 1242 there is. Thank you. 1243 Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Sanford is 1244 recognized. Mr. SANFORD. I don't want to be a broken record, but I 1245 do want to follow up on what Chairman Young was saying, which 1246

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, thanks. And for Admiral White, I will 1322 just--I will follow up with you later about the Navy Arctic 1323 Road Map. We are--my office is taking a look at that in a 1324 little more detail, but I will just follow up with you 1325 1326 specifically on that later. 1327 Admiral WHITE.) Yes, sir. 1328 Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thank you very much. 1329 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 1330 Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Unless Mr. Garamendi 1331 has more questions --1332 Mr. GARAMENDI. Just a quick question. A lot of the icebreaking activities would seem to benefit commerce, 1333 specific ships that may want to go from here to there. 1334 you charge for the services, breaking the ice so the ship can 1335 1336 pass or get unstuck? Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I suppose the best example 1337 would be, if you look at the Great Lakes icebreaking mission 1338 1339 that we have, we do not charge for those services. And--although, what we have done there is develop a tiered 1340 1341 approach to it. We keep the major arteries open, for lack of a better description, and then we leave it to commercial 1342 icebreaking services and those contracted for -- to open up the 1343 entrances into the ports and the small harbors. 1344 We used to do it all, but over the course of the last 1345 six or seven years we have really changed that, and trying to 1346